One of the better discoveries of the last few months was Jonathan Clements’ books. From Wu: The Chinese Empress who schemed, seduced and murdered her way to become a living God to Mannerheim: President, Soldier, Spy, from An Armchair Traveller’s History of Finland to A Brief History of the Vikings: The Last Pagans or the First Modern Europeans? these books are tremendous efforts of introducing slices of history to laypeople. And the language is often witty:
The Russians were not particularly impressed with Finland. Since they already had trees, lakes and snow of their own, the country initially had little to offer but a buffer zone between them and the rest of Europe, with limited transport and amenities.
For the later Tsars, after the tragic assassination of Alexander II by Russian anarchists in 1881, Finland became a popular holiday destination because it was not Russia, and Finns could usually be counted on not to blow them up or shoot them while they were fishing or sunning themselves.
The treaty specified that the roads, bridges and towns of Karelia should be left intact, but when the Russians moved in, they discovered they had forgotten to stipulate that the Finns should remain. They marched into ghost towns, devoid of people, and often with the cultural treasures stripped away.
But in this article, I want to talk about an enormously influential business and political book, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War in Clements’ translation. This ancient Chinese military treatise, written around 5th century BC, is magnificently reinterpreted into a 21st-century language (I must admit, I tried to read this book in other translations and quickly gave up).
Clements’ commentaries on each chapter about how he came up with some word choices or sharing enlightening details about Sun Tzu’s period are outstanding. For example, to explain better what Sun Tzu meant about
When they [the enemy] feed grain to the horses and eat meat themselves, when they do not stow cooking utensils or return to camp, they are determined to fight to the death.
Clements explains:
The meaning apparent in ‘eating meat’ implies that the soldiers have slaughtered their oxen in order to make one final feast. Without the oxen, they have no ability to pull their heavier wagons away from the camp and so plainly do not expect to retreat. It has a resonance equivalent to ‘burning one’s boats’ in the European tradition.
Burning one’s boats alludes to Cortés, who ordered his people to destroy their ships so that they had no option to go back home but go forward and conquer.
Although this manual for war was written thousands of years ago, its concepts remarkably apply to conflicts today. I will let the astute reader make their own judgements based on the following quotes and how to relate them to ongoing wars:
Thus, while soldiers have heard that it is stupid to move too fast, it is also unwise to take too long. There has never been a long war that worked to the benefit of a kingdom.
Bring what you need from home, and take provisions from your enemy. Thus, your army will have enough to eat. Sending forces far away is a heavy expense to the homeland.
Prisoners should be fed and treated well; you can win over the enemy to gain strength.
This is how war is waged. It is better to take a kingdom whole than to destroy it. It is better to take an army whole than to destroy it. It is better to take a battalion, a company or a platoon whole than to destroy them.
The greatest form of soldiery is to disrupt your enemy’s plans. In descending order, the next best options are:
• disrupting his communications,
• confusing his soldiers,
• and only then, attacking his cities.
Attack his cities only when there is no alternative.
This is how you fight:
• When you outnumber ten to one, surround.
• When you outnumber five to one, invade.
• When you outnumber two to one, attack.
• When you are equally matched, divide his forces.
• When you are outnumbered, defend.
• When you are heavily outnumbered, escape.
In olden times, the truly skilled warriors won easy victories. Hence, when those skilled warriors were victorious, their wisdom brought them no fame. Their courage brought no honour. They fought battles without mistakes. Without mistakes, victory was certain, for the enemy had already lost. For the victorious army first arranges its victory, and only then begins battle. A losing army begins the battle, and only then attempts to win.
Some orders from your prince should not be followed.
Know the enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles, there will be no danger.
Know not the enemy yet know yourself, and you shall win half your battles.
Know neither the enemy nor yourself, and you shall surely lose every fight.
An army formation is like water. When swift, be like the wind. When at rest, be like the forest. When raiding, be like fire. When immobile, be like a mountain, and as inscrutable as shadow. When in motion, be like lightning.
Do not trust that they will not come. Trust that you will be ready if they do. Do not trust that they will not attack. Trust that you are unassailable if they do.
When surrounding a unit, be sure to leave an escape. If they are ready to fight to the death, do not press too hard.
When there are whispers, and nods, and quiet words among the troops, your enemy has lost his men.
See your men as infant children and they will follow you into the deepest valley. See your men as beloved sons, and they will follow you to the death. But if a general is kind yet undisciplined, or loving but unclear with orders, unable to shake off his own confusion, then the knights will be as spoiled sons, impossible to employ.
Strategy is a doctrine of deceit. When you are capable, act as if incapable. When you are busy, act as if idle. When you are close, appear to be far away. When you are far away, appear to be close. Show openings to lure your enemy. Feign confusion to capture them.
Attack when they are unprepared. Turn up when they do not expect it. This is how the strategist succeeds, by giving nothing away beforehand.
Unfortunately, I cannot cite espionage techniques as it would mean to quote the whole chapter dedicated to espionage. The espionage chapter is a short one but invaluable, and if this translation contained only this chapter, buying this book would still be money well spent.
Lastly, I want to conclude with a quote from another book by Clements:
When there is a rival state over the mountains prepared to offer support to exiles, outlaws and outcasts, there will always be trouble. As the philosopher Confucius argued, true civilisation had a habit of luring the border peoples in. They are tempted by its benefits, to the extent that they cannot live without them, and soon buy, or beg, or barter them for themselves. Sometimes they steal, but eventually they are subsumed within the civilisation itself. Today, we would call it ‘soft power’.